Does separating vaccinated and unvaccinated students in schools result in better health outcomes? An agent-based model for mumps by Moosavi, Seyed Hossein
 Does separating vaccinated and unvaccinated students in schools result in 
better health outcomes? An agent-based model for mumps  
 
 






Mechanical and Industrial Engineering 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Applied Science (Industrial Engineering) at 
Concordia University 
















School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:  Seyed Hossein Moosavi  
 
        Entitled: Does separating vaccinated and unvaccinated students in schools result 
in better health outcomes? An agent-based model for mumps  
 
 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Master of Applied Science (Industrial Engineering) 
 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with 
respect to originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
 
 Nadia Bhuiyan  Chair 
 
 Ali Akgunduz  Examiner 
 
 Lisa Kakinami  Examiner 
 
Ketra Schmitt   Supervisor 
 
Approved by      




Dean of Faculty 
 





Does separating vaccinated and unvaccinated students in schools result in 
better health outcomes? An agent-based model for mumps 
 
Seyed Hossein Moosavi 
 
      A rise in unvaccinated children and subsequent uptick in vaccine-preventable disease has 
led to a vigorous public debate regarding vaccination status, with some physicians and 
parents calling for unvaccinated children to be banned from clinics or schools. We simulated 
a mumps outbreak in a small school system and evaluated how key disease dynamics were 
impacted by instituting a policy of separating vaccinated and unvaccinated children into 
different schools. In addition, we evaluated the impact of school separation when used 
concurrently with physical distancing, self-isolation, school closure, and mandatory isolation. 
   We used Agent Based Simulation to model mumps outbreaks among students in a small 
city. Agents move between the school, home and other places on a daily basis. Mumps 
parameters are modeled based on current literature on infectious diseases. Multiple control 
strategies were investigated in terms of infection rate, outbreak length, and total costs. 
    Our motivation for this work was to evaluate the disease impact of a school separation 
strategy. Given the potential ethical and legal complications, the associated health benefits 
would have to be significant to persuade policy makers to adopt such a policy. Our results do 
not suggest that a school separation strategy should be adopted in most of the scenarios since 
this strategy increases the number of infected students, the chance of outbreaks, and the 
associated cost in the majority of them. In addition, our work demonstrates that educating 
students on the benefits of adopting physical distancing and self-isolation is effective in 
controlling the mumps outbreak size and cost in a population with 90% vaccine coverage, 
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Vaccination programs have been hugely successful in reducing infectious disease outbreaks; 
however, rising vaccine hesitancy has limited the ability of vaccination programs to 
successfully control outbreaks. A variety of non-pharmaceutical interventions have been 
evaluated, including the effect of social patterns and individual behavior on lowering the 
infection rates and controlling the outbreaks. They suggest that in some contexts, restricting 
population contact rates could be a potential useful control measure [1,2,3]. Markel et al. 
recommend isolation, school closure, and cancellation of public gatherings, which are all 
non-pharmaceutical interventions, in parallel with vaccination and medication for severe 
influenza pandemics [4]. Moreover, using a mathematical model for smallpox, Del Valle et 
al. suggest if behavioral change is combined with other interventions, it can reduce the 
number of infections and outbreak duration[5]. 
Social distancing, in which individuals avoid crowded places in order to reduce the chance of 
infection, has been examined by many researchers [6, 7,8]. The goal of social distancing is to 
decrease attack rates and mortality rates and also delay peak period in order to better control 
the virus. Kelso et al. suggest that social distancing can have a critical role in control of a 
pandemic if implemented quickly and maintained [7]. School closure is one instance of social 
distancing. High levels of interactions between students in schools makes them a critical 
place for virus transmission and explains the academic and policy interest in educational 
facilities [9]. Hyman et al. recommend school closure for controlling influenza pandemic as 
their results show school closure reduces upper respiratory illness [8]. Using a large-scale 
social contact survey, Hens et al. show that school closure can reduce infectious disease 
spread [10].  Isolation of infectious individuals is another intervention which is investigated 
in a number of researches [11,12,13]. Fergguson et al. suggest that, if feasible, a quick case 
isolation strategy could reduce the infectiousness of individuals significantly in an influenza 
pandemic [13] and Wang et al. show that patient isolation delays influenza spread [12]. If 
isolation is practiced voluntarily, it is called self-isolation, that could be staying at home and 
avoiding contacts with others. Holmberg et al. reveal that about one third of the U.S. states in 
2005-2006 had plans to recommend self-isolation to adults including staying at home [14].  
Physical distancing, the idea which suggests avoiding close contacts with others, is another 
personal protective behavior that could have a significant impact on the severity of an 
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outbreak [15]. Physical distancing has already been practiced in previous outbreaks in the 
world such as H1N1(2009) and SARS (2003)  in Singapore  [16] . Karimi et al. showed that 
physical distancing combined with other protective behaviors can significantly reduce attack 
rate and peak number of infections in a university setting [15].  
Prevention strategies are not limited to these measures. Many states in the U.S. have policies 
that give schools the authority to exclude those students who are not vaccinated for a limited 
time during outbreaks which, as a result, control the spread of the virus and reduce number of 
infections in the population [17]. These interventions could be considered as a type of 
nonvoluntary social distancing [18].   
Another approach that has recently been focused  in the media is the practice of dismissing 
unvaccinated families by some family physicians and pediatricians. Although the Center of 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is not in favor of this approach, dismissing these 
families is not uncommon [19]. In a survey done by Flanagan-Klygis et al. in 2005, 38% of 
physicians declared they would not provide service for families who refused all vaccinations 
and 28% would dismiss families in case they did not accept specific vaccinations [20]. A 
newer study suggests that, while there is variation by region, families who refuse vaccination 
are dismissed by 20% of the pediatricians [19]. Diekema suggests that this approach is not 
beneficial for the public health [21]. However, physicians who don’t accept these families 
claim that unvaccinated children pose an infection risk to other children and staff in the 
clinic, and if they dismiss this group of families, the infection probability in the waiting room 
is minimized [22]. Research by O’Leary et al. support the idea that this policy may raise 
vaccine uptake by underscoring vaccine significance [19].  However, no research has yet 
evaluated the impacts of this policy on disease dynamics during an outbreak [23]. 
Although several control measures have been proposed and investigated in epidemiological 
research, more effective and cost-efficient measures are needed to better control and prevent 
the epidemics. In this research, we propose a novel approach for social intervention and 
analyze its effects by means of simulation and cost analysis. The idea of dismissing 
unvaccinated children in clinics led us to consider a similar strategy for separating 
unvaccinated children into different schools. We implement a strategy where unvaccinated 
students are separated from vaccinated students by transferring them to a different school. 
This approach is called Separation strategy in this thesis. We compare separation strategy 
with no separation strategy, where vaccinated and unvaccinated students are not separated.  
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There are a variety of practical and ethical issues involved in implementing this policy. The 
beauty of simulation, and particularly agent-based simulation, is that it allows us to create 
experiments to evaluate the implication of policies without involving human subjects. These 
policies will likely be most important for low vaccination communities. Agent Based 
Modeling and Simulation (ABMS) allows us to create a community of individuals with a low 
rate of vaccination. We model the implementation of school closure at the beginning of a 
possible outbreak in the unvaccinated school. This school will be prepared for small signals 
of an outbreak and will close the school as soon as number of infections passes a threshold. 
From a purely disease control perspective, if the combined policy of school separation and 
school closure can control the outbreak successfully, or at least does not result in an adverse 
effect in a potential outbreak in the separated school, this policy could be considered 
beneficial for public health. Moreover, the separation might encourage resistant families to 
vaccinate their children in order to avoid the possible difficulties of sending their children to 
a specific school either for convenience or health reasons, which as a result, would increase 
the vaccine coverage of the population in long term. 
By removing unvaccinated students from most schools, the chance of a large scale outbreak 
in those schools might decrease considerably. In this research, we evaluate this notion by 
creating a model city and simulating school attendance for high school students in different 
parts of the city using an agent based model. During the simulation, an outbreak is initialized 
to infect several individuals. The model runs until the outbreak is eradicated.  By running 
different scenarios and combining them we investigate the benefit of each approach. The 
efficacy of each measure is analyzed by comparing the attack rates and anticipated costs of 
each approach with the baseline scenario and other policy measures.   
Throughout this research, we consider other prevention policies such as social distancing, 
self-isolation, and physical distancing. We evaluated the effects of implementing these social 
patterns in both the separation and no separation strategies. 
We investigate the outbreaks of mumps in our analysis. A study by Van Loon, F. P., et al. 
shows that implementation of mumps vaccine in 1967 had a huge impact in protection of US 
citizens [24]; however, the risk of its outbreaks raised in recent years through a drop in 
vaccine uptake and one of its important causes appears to be the rise of non-vaccinators and 
vaccine hesitant parents [25, 26]. It is now evident that governments are worried about the 
practice of vaccine hesitancy by individuals [26]. The anti-vaccination movement, which first 
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originated in the 19
th
 century and was strengthened again in 1990s as a result of some 
unproven publications about the negative effects of measles, mumps and rubella vaccine 
(MMR) on children’s health, has provoked a trend of hesitation and vaccine bypassing in 
families during the last two decades [25,27,28].  Consequently, it resulted in an increased 
probability of Mumps outbreaks. There are also other important elements which negatively 
impact vaccine uptake such as poor access to health care [25].  However, mumps outbreak 
emergence could be a result of intense exposures, overwhelming the protection offered by the 
vaccine, waning immunity, etc. [29]. Several mumps outbreaks have occurred in different 
countries in the last decade [30]. In fact, the populations with routine mumps vaccination 
have not completely removed the chance of an outbreak. The UK and the USA have had 
large outbreaks [31] and the mumps detection rate in Denmark has increased by a factor of 10 
in the last decade [30].The United Kingdom faced an epidemic of mumps during 2004-2005 
with more than 56000 reported cases in England and Wales [32]. Many individuals of this 
group were students and their illness was related to outbreaks in universities and colleges 
across this area [33]. Universities and schools are a prime location for the spread of Mumps, 
mainly because of the high rates of social interaction and shared accommodation [34]. In 
order to prepare for such an outbreak and minimize the probable costs, information about the 
spread of mumps and its consequences in educational settings is necessary. 
Mumps is a contagious vaccine preventable disease with a medium to high level of 
contagiousness. Its main symptom is a characteristic facial swelling, while inflammation of 
other body parts such as ovaries is the additional potential complication. In extreme cases, 
infertility, meningitis, hearing loss, or even death are possible, though severe complications 
are scarce [31,35,36].  Direct contact, contamination of fomites, or droplet spread are major 
routes of mumps’ transmission. Its incubation period is between 15 to 24 days with a median 
of 19 days [37]. The virus is highly contagious 1 to 2 days before the onset of symptoms and 
this status is maintained for several days [38]. The infectiousness period starts 3 days before 
the appearance of symptoms and lasts for 12 days [39]. If people get mumps, they have a 
high chance of acquiring lifetime immunity; however, JP Gut et al. suggest there is still a 
possiblity that individuals get infected again [40]. 
A wealth of mathematical modeling research focuses on vaccine-preventable infectious 
diseases, in particular Influenza, and some of this research specifically concentrate on 
educational settings [41,42,43,44].  However, little research exists on mathematical or 
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simulation modeling of mumps [45,46, 47]. Moneim analyses a number of infectious diseases 
including mumps using simulation while importance of latent period, the time from infection 
to infectiousness, is his target [45]. Kanaan et al. use mathematical modeling for mumps and 
rubella, and by the use of matrix models, estimate the basic reproduction number for these 
diseases [47]. Simoesa, J. M. simulates a mumps outbreak in Portugal using agent based 
model and provides a spatial pattern of infection [46]. Nonetheless, existing research does not 
thoroughly explore the dynamics of mumps.  Besides, the authors could not find a research 
concerning simulation of mumps in educational environment. Hence, considering the existing 
risk of mumps outbreaks, the necessity of practicing mumps modeling specially in students’ 
community is evident.  Accordingly, we examined the spread of mumps in this research. We 
obtained some mumps parameters from existing literature and calculated a number of others 
















2. Research Methodology 
 
 
In order to analyze the impact of separation strategies and protective behaviors, we 
constructed an agent based simulation which represents the occurrence of a mumps outbreak 
among high school students in a city using Matlab 2015a software. The structure of the 
disease and elements of its behavior such as latent period and vaccine effectiveness were 
modeled based on the literature on mumps and other infectious diseases. Some basic elements 
of mumps were calculated based on influenza literature.  
 
The size of the city and number of stations where the students attend are made based on 
assumptions. The participation of students in the stations was acquired based on literature and 
assumptions.  
 
The agent based simulation was run for several scenarios including baseline scenario, school 
closure scenario, communicable disease safety initiative scenario, and mandatory isolation 
scenario. These scenarios are discussed in section 4.2. Each scenario is run with and without 
implementing separation strategy which requires unvaccinated students to study in a 
separated school. 
 
The scenarios and the effect of separation strategy on them were analyzed regarding the 
number of infections, and the costs associated with infections such as healthcare costs, and 
prevention costs. These costs were obtained from literature. 
 
The protective behavior of students and their attitude towards implementing them after a 
communicable disease safety initiative were grasped using a previous research in which 
bachelor students at Concordia Universitry were surveyed [15]. Since the age difference 
between bachelor students and high school students is negligible, we used the data from this 
research. 
 
One of the key challenges of this literature is the paucity of disease transmission parameter 





Finally, the results of these scenarios are compared in terms of attack rate and costs, and 
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2.1. Mumps Transmission Dynamics  
 
2.1.1. Spread pattern 
 
Susceptible agents in the system are capable of receiving the virus from potential infectious 
agents around them. Transmission is achieved by an effective contact between the virus 
carrier and a susceptible agent. Successful transmission can only happen when a susceptible 
agent comes within a minimum distance of an infectious agent.   
 
During the simulation process, a susceptible agent enters a location in which there would be 
possibly a number of infectious agents. It stays there for an amount of time, and during this 
period, there is a possibility of virus communication. This chance, which would be calculated 
when the agent exits the station, depends on a set of infectious agents in the station which 
have satisfied the distance constraint discussed above. This radius, in our simulation, is 
assumed to be 4 meters. However, agents who are within 2 meters of the infectious agent 
have a higher chance of infection than those who are between 2 to 4 meters. We assumed that 
chance of infection, if the susceptible agent is within 2 to 4 meters of an infectious agent, is 
only 20% of the chance of infection when an agent is within 2 meters distance. We reached 
this number based on calibration of the transmission probabilities so that the simulated attack 
rates were close to observed rates in real outbreaks.  
In addition, the duration of contact is an important decisive factor for increasing the infection 
probability. According to Haber’s work on influenza [48], contact length has a positive effect 
in raising the chance of virus spread .The probability of infection between two people for 
specific time t could be calculated using cumulative distribution function of exponential 
distribution: 
 
                                    P(t)=1-𝑒−𝜆𝑡                                     (1) 
Where 𝜆 is the transmission rate of the disease i.e. the probability of virus transmission 
between two infectious and susceptible adults in one minute. Mumps is also spread by droplet 





In reality, a student has several contacts with other infectious students in a specific location 
and considering the effect of them, as a whole, is necessary. Thus, by developing the previous 
formula, we can include the contact duration of the susceptible agent with all the infectious 







Where n is the number of infectious agents in the station. If we assume that the duration of 





2.1.2. Mumps transmission rate 
 
In this section, we obtain the transmission rate of mumps based on transmission rate of 
Influenza. The reason for implementing the influenza value is the fact that we could not find 
this value in the literature, and obtaining this value by biological experiment, which would be 
the best method,   is beyond the scope of this research. However, with regards to the 
existence of other values for mumps, we can find estimation for the desired parameter by 
getting the help of influenza transmission rate which is available in the literature. 
The basic reproductive number which in epidemiology is defined as “the number of 
individuals infected by a single infected individual during his or her entire infectious period, 
in a population which is entirely susceptible” [49], is calculated as follows [50]: 
                                                                       𝑅 = 𝑐 𝜆 𝑑                                               (2) 
Where 
c is the average number of contacts per unit time, 
𝜆 is the transmission rate, and 
d is the duration of infectiousness. 
 




                                                              𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑧𝑎 =  𝑐𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑑𝑖 
 𝑅𝑀𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑠 =  𝑐𝑚𝜆𝑚𝑑𝑚 
As our model is based on a previous simulation modeling of Influenza outbreak in an 
educational setting [44], and contact patterns are almost similar in different educational 
environments, the number of contacts per unit time (c) in Eq. 2 remains consistent for 
influenza and mumps. We used the average contacts of students for this value. Thus: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑚 
We consider the duration of infectiousness for both diseases. Mumps is contagious for 
approximately 7 days [51,52,53] while influenza is contagious for approximately 4.1 days 
[54].  
𝑑𝑖 = 4.1 
𝑑𝑚 = 7 
We also used the basic reproductive number for both diseases. The basic reproduction 
number for mumps is roughly twice that of influenza, 4-7  versus 2-3  [55,56].We used the 
midpoints of these two diseases for calculating the factor: 
                                                            𝑅𝑀𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑠 = 5.5  , 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑧𝑎 = 2.5 
                                                                        
𝑅𝑀𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑠
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑧𝑎
   = 2.2 
𝑐𝑚𝜆𝑚𝑑𝑚 = 2.2 *  𝑐𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑑𝑖  
Since 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑚  we will have: 
𝜆𝑚𝑑𝑚 = 2.2 *  𝜆𝑖𝑑𝑖  
 𝜆𝑚 ∗ 7 = 2.2 ∗  𝜆𝑖 ∗ 4.1 
𝜆𝑚 = 1.29 ∗ 𝜆𝑖 
Haber et al. [48] suggest that the probability of influenza infection between infectious and 
susceptible adults in one minute is 0.00032 for people between 18 and 64. We could not find 
this number for children, and assumed that high school students are more similar to adults in 
our calculation. By using influenza transmission rate in our equation, we extracted the 
mumps transmission rate: 
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 𝜆𝑚 = 1.29  * 0.00032 = 0.00041 
 
 
2.1.3. Length of Disease Stages: latent and infections period 
 
In order to simulate the virus transmission, we needed to know the latent period and 
infectious period. Latent period is defined as the duration of a patient’s exposed state in 
our SEIR model.   We calculated the latent period using the reported incubation period 
which is defined as the time from exposure to onset of disease [57]. Incubation period is 
similar to latent period, but it is longer since it is defined as the time that an 
asymptomatic individual sheds the virus. The range of incubation period for mumps is 
12-25 days with an average of 16-18 days [36]. 
3 days before the appearance of symptoms, the infectiousness arises [39]. Therefore, we 
estimate latent period by subtracting this amount from the incubation ranges and average 
discussed above. Subsequently, we can write a triangular distribution for the latent 
period:  
a=9, c=14, b= 22 
Where a and b are the ranges and c is the average of mumps latent period.  
 
We also reviewed the literature to construct a distribution function for mumps infectious 
period, which was used as patient’s infectious state length in our model. Infectiousness 
starts 3 days before symptoms emerge and continues till 9 days after the onset, which 
makes the estimated total duration of infectiousness 12 days [39]. However, the 
probability of virus transmission doesn’t remain the same in different days. Polgreen et 
al. developed a function which represents the probability of transmission from an 




) = −0.954 − 0.234(𝑡) 
After the emergence of symptoms, we can observe a quick decrease in the chance of 
virus transmission as time passes. It is expected that the majority of infected individuals 
who observed the symptoms don’t communicate the virus after 5 days of symptoms’ 
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appearance.   The percentage of the individuals who communicate the virus after this 
period can be placed between 8% to 15% [51]. By using the average of these numbers in 
our model, we assumed that only 11.5% of infected individuals remain infectious after 5 
days. 
 
Previous studies have suggested that virus from saliva specimens of people infected with 
mumps could be cultured more than 5 and up to 9 days after parotitis, which is the 
emergence of parotid gland inflammation [51]. We also know that high level of mumps 
infection appears 1 to 2 days before the onset of symptoms [38] and continues 5 days 
after the parotitis onset [36]. Based on our review of the literature, most individuals are 
infectious for 6 to 8 days, but some are infectious for 9 to 12 days. Therefore, we 
assigned a uniform distribution to the length of infectious period. We considered 6-8 
days for 88.5% of infected cases and used the longer period of 9-12 days for 11.5% of 
them. 
 
Infectious Period            Probability       distribution 
6-8 88.5%           uniform 
9-12 11.5%           uniform 







Day after onset Point estimate 
(Wald 95% Cl) 
0 0.282 (0.236-0.333) 
1 0.237 (0.205-0.271) 
2 0.196 (0.170-0.225) 
3 0.162 (0.135-0.193) 
4 0.132 (0.102-0.169) 
5 0.107 (0.076-0.148) 
6 0.087 (0.056-0.131) 
7 0.07 (0.041-0.115) 
8 0.056 (0.030-0.102) 
9 0.044 (0.022-0.089) 
10 0.035 (0.016-0.079) 
11 0.028 (0.011-0.069) 
12 0.022 (0.008-0.061) 
13 0.018 (0.006-0.053) 
14 0.014 (0.004-0.047) 
15 0.011 (0.003-0.041) 
 










2.2. Vaccine Effectiveness 
One of our main goals in this research was to discover the effect of mumps vaccine in an 
outbreak. A lot of students in the schools were vaccinated against mumps during their 
childhood. Thus, we considered the effect of vaccine in our system by searching for mumps 
vaccine related parameters in the literature. At the beginning of our simulation, in the 
vaccine-based scenario, the agents are assigned as vaccinated or not vaccinated with a certain 
probability. This probability is based on immunization coverage which is the percent of 
people in the society who have received vaccine [58]. We used vaccine coverage to create the 
fraction of students in the university who have taken mumps vaccine. The vaccinated agents 
do not necessarily have immunity, and still a chance of infection threatens them.  To show 
this possibility in our model, we implemented vaccine effectiveness from mumps literature, 
which is “the percentage reduction in the frequency of influenza infections among people 
vaccinated compared with the frequency among those who were not vaccinated, assuming 
that the vaccine is the cause of this reduction” [59]. Vaccine effectiveness could be obtained 
based on final attack rate, which is the ratio of the final number of infected people in an 
outbreak to the number of primary susceptible individuals [60]. We can also use infection 
probabilities [61]: 










   [60,61] 
Where ARU and ARV are used as the final attack rates in groups of unvaccinated and 
vaccinated people, and 𝑃.0 and 𝑃.1 are the probabilities of infection for unvaccinated and 
vaccinated people. 
While this paper examines mumps infection solely, the vaccine that has been used against 
mumps since 1960s is a three-in-one Measles-Mumps-Rubella (MMR) vaccine [24].  The 
median coverage for 2 doses of MMR vaccine among kindergartners in USA in 2014-2015 
was 94%. Coverage ranged from 86.9% in Colorada to 99.2% in Mississipi [62].  In Quebec, 
the coverage of one dose MMR had been more than 95% between 1980 until 1999 [63]. 
Other data demonstrates that the average MMR vaccine coverage for the children who were 
born in 1988-1989 in Quebec was between 93% to 96.1% while this number was about 
92.4% for the children who were born in 1996-1998 [64].We used both 90% and 95% 
vaccine coverage in our simulations. 
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 Accepted recommendations suggest getting two doses of this vaccine [65]. Although, 
previously some people received only one dose of the vaccine, gradually, a more intense 
trend was observed for receiving two dose vaccines especially after 1996 in Canada. For one 
dose of MMR vaccine, estimates of vaccine effectiveness have been between 62%-85%, 
while for two doses, vaccine effectiveness estimates ranged from 76% to 95% [66]. The 
generally agreed upon effectiveness of two doses is 88%  [67,68]. Literature information 
implies that most individuals born after 1992 in Ontario, forming about 90% of them, took 
the two-dose vaccine of mumps and the rest took one dose [66]. In our model, we assumed 



























3. Cost Study 
 
Costs were calculated based on several factors related to each scenario. Depending on the 
prevention strategy used in the model, there are different costs. In this research, self-isolation 
costs include lost work hours, lost productivity, and communicable disease safety initiative. 
Communicable disease safety initiative consists of holding classes to develop the knowledge 
of students about mumps and prevention strategies. Social distancing costs are basically 
related to class cancellation and school closure which includes lost work hours and lost 
productivity.  Communicable disease safety initiative cost is the only cost that we considered 
for physical distancing. In addition, school separation involves extra cost of transportation. It 
actually involves the higher cost that students need to pay when their school is changed. In 
our model, we assumed that students participate in the closest school to their home. 
Therefore, any policy to change their school would bring them an extra transportation cost. 
We also assumed that only the unvaccinated students would pay this extra cost. Although, in 
reality, the costs of these scenarios might also include social and psychological difficulties, 










Transportation Cost of scenarios
 




The costs evaluated in this research are as follows: 
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3.1.  Lost wage    
Among high schools and colleges in United States, about 4 out of 5 students work with 
average of 19 hours a week [69]. When students get sick they would lose the opportunity to 
do their job. To calculate the lost wage, we assumed that 80% of students work. We also used 
a normal distribution for the students’ wage.  Since we could not find a source for high school 
students’ wage in U.S., we assumed that mean wage is 7.25 dollars per hour which is the 
minimum wage in the United States, and standard deviation is assumed to be 1 dollar. By the 
use of the wage information, we calculate the lost wage per day for every student in the 
model. This daily cost was applied for all ill students who were assigned to stay at home 
during their illness. 
3.2. Lost learning  
We considered the cost of lost classes (lost learning) for those students who don’t attend 
school in their illness period. When a student misses a school class, he is missing an amount 
of money which is previously paid for him through government or his family. In order to 
obtain a reasonable understanding of the missed classes cost, we considered the human 
capital method which calculates the value of school based on all the payments to employees 
in a school.  This method is based on the assumption that the sum of all the educators’ 
earnings is equal to the value of formal education. Lempel et al found that the sum of all 
employees’ income in elementary or secondary schools is $7.3 billion per week.  They 
estimate that the cost of lost learning as a result of school closure policy in United States is 
$6.1 billion per week [70]. The cost of lost learning for each student during school closure 
was calculated from the total number of elementary and secondary school students, 55 
million in 2010 [71].  Therefore, we can estimate that the cost of one week lost learning 
during school closure for a student is $110.5 and for one school day is $22.1 ($24.41 in 2015 
dollars). We assumed the cost of lost learning for one student during school closure is equal 
to the cost of lost learning for each sick student while school is open. 
 
 
3.3.  Healthcare cost 
Healthcare costs are the highest costs associated with the mumps outbreaks. Mumps 
complications have a considerable cost of hospitalization which would eventually result in a 
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high cost for an infected individual. However, the probability of complications’ occurrence is 
not high and it could even be as low as 0.005% (for deafness) [72]. No specific treatment 
exists for the mumps virus other than analgesics for pain and swelling, however, treatment for 
complications can result in considerable cost [72,73]. 
There are several possible complications for mumps which based on their severity and 
hospitalization days, the costs are different. Central nervous system involvement is a common 
result of most frequent complications of mumps which are orchitis, mastitis, meningitis and 
encephalitis, oophoritis, deafness, and pancreatitis [72]. The probability of complications, 
hospitalization, and cost of hospitalization for age group of greater than 15 years old are 
shown in Table 3: 
 








Uncomplicated 51.49 % 1% 8898$ 124.31$ 
Aseptic 
meningitis 
7.5% 25% 18,983$ 143.63$ 
Encephalitis 0.01% 100 29,556$ 337.95$ 
Orchitis 38% (male) 1% 7,184$ 115.04$ 
Pancreatitis 4% 10% 18,752$ 70.63$ 
Deafness 0.005% 10% 24,132$ 207.49$ 
Mastitis 31% (female) 1% 9,138$ 195.25$ 
Oophoritis 5% (female) 10% 15,896$ 356.85$ 
Table 3: Mumps complications [72] (2001 dollars) 
 
Most of the patients would not have any complication (48.51%). We assumed that all patients 
visit a clinic or hospital after symptoms arise. We also assumed that all the patients with 
complication, who don’t become hospitalized, do an outpatient visit. The cost of an 
uncomplicated mumps outpatient visit based on Hinman et al study is 124.31$ [72]. The costs 
of all the complications according to their probabilities were considered in the model to 
calculate the medication costs. We did not include long term costs associated with the 
complications in our calculations. We used the probability of complication occurrence and 
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3.4. Communicable disease safety initiative   
We analyzed a scenario in our simulation where a communicable disease safety initiative is 
assumed to be implemented. In this scenario, we assumed that a communicable disease safety 
initiative is held in every class of every school in the city so as to increase  students’ 
knowledge about self-isolation and physical distancing, and we also assumed that this 
knowledge will encourage them to do self-initiated protective behaviors.  Through these 
sessions, an expert explains mumps and self-initiated preventive behaviors to students. 
Students are assumed to gain an increased tendency for doing self-isolation and physical 
distancing after this class. This increased tendency was implemented from a research by 
Karimi et al. in which a cross sectional study was done for influenza control using Health 
Belief Model (HBM) [15]. HBM investigates different psychological and behavioral factors 
associated with a health action including perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, 
perceived benefits, and perceived barriers [74].  In the Karimi et al. research, a health 
specialist provided some information about self-initiated preventive behaviors to some of 
undergraduate students at a university and the effect of this session on students’ protective 
behavior was investigated [15]. The results of  their research suggest that the held session was 
effective to raise self-isolation and physical distancing by 41% [15]. We applied this rate as 
the effect of a communicable disease safety initiative in our model. We were able to apply 
these results to our model by using results from questions that did not specifically target 
influenza, and it makes sense that students might have the same concepts about using self-
isolation and physical distancing when they face any kind of outbreak in school.  
In order to calculate the cost of the communicable disease safety initiative, it was assumed 
that it takes an hour work of a health specialist. The median of a public health specialist’s 
hourly salary in U.S. is 19$ [75]. We used this amount as the cost of communicable disease 
safety initiative for each class in every school, or 100 total classes.  
 
3.5. Parental Absenteeism  
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When children are ill, parents will in some cases stay home or hire a babysitter. Based on 
data from literature, Sander et al assume that when a child (<12) is sick, the affected 
household stays at home for 2.5 days each week [76]. As the average infectiousness period of 
a person infected by mumps is around one week, we assumed that all the affected households 
of students in high school also stay at home for 2.5 days.  
We used the average income of individuals in United States as the income of parents in our 
analysis. Per capita personal income in U.S. in 2014 was $46,129 [77].  By using the monthly 
income of an individual, we calculated the cost of parental absenteeism. 
         Parental Absenteeism cost per week (one individual)= 1/12 * $46,129 * 2.5/30= $320.3 
($327.01 in 2015 dollars) 
      
3.6. Transportation    
We used the cost of transportation to compare separation strategy and no separation strategy. 
When unvaccinated students are separated from vaccinated students, it is assumed that they 
have moved to other school, and that their originally assigned school was the closest school 
to the student’s home. Under the separation strategy, only one school accepts unvaccinated 
students, so it is reasonable to assume that when a student’s school is changed, the cost of 
transportation is increased.  
The average expenditure for every student transported in United States at public expense 
(2010-2011) was 928 dollars ($1008.7 in 2015 dollars)  [78]. We assumed that all the 
students in our model use public transportation and the cost of students’ transportation in the 
no separation strategy is equal to the average cost in United States. In the separation strategy, 
students who change their school have an additional cost of transportation because their 
school is located further away. We estimated the additional cost based on the costs of bus 
transportation under school district consolidation. Hanley suggests that school consolidation 
in state of Iowa has an increased cost of 0.6% to 10.6% [79].  We used this range for school 
separation strategy since school district consolidation requires many students to travel a 
greater distance than they used to travel before, which is similar to the school separation 





























4. Model Development 
 
In order to analyze the separation strategies and the effect of protective behaviors on the 
outbreaks, we modeled a mumps epidemic in a city using an agent-based simulation. Using 
object oriented programming in Matlab R2015a, we created our model based on 
implementing agents in the simulation. Each agent represents a unique student in the model 
and has several attributes which are assigned to it including vaccination status, infectious 
period, school and home ID, complication status, treatment cost, etc. 
 
We constructed a synthetic city with population of 3000 high school students. Only students 
are considered in the model and we assumed that other individuals do not infect the students. 
We also assumed that students’ ages are greater than 15 years old and that half of the 
population in the model is female and the other half is male.   
 
In this model, each individual is given a random schedule based on Table 4 at the beginning 
of every day and would follow these schedules to go to different stations through end of the 
simulation. 
The stations include School, Home, Hub, and Clinic. The model includes 10 schools, 3000 
Homes, 100 Hubs and 30 clinics. In this research, Hub is a representation of any place that a 
student would go in the city except school, home and clinic which would let him to have 
contact with other students. In fact, by using a simplifying assumption, we considered all the 
malls, playgrounds, libraries, street, etc. that have a potential of infection as hubs.  
Student








In this model, the student should necessarily be in one of the stations at a time. Every student 
leaves a location in each break and enters to another place based on probabilities. Each 
student attends a specific school every day (except weekends) which is assigned randomly at 
the beginning of the simulation. S/he would stay there for a few hours during the day. When 
students finish their school, they have the choices to go to a Hub, Home or clinic and after 
choosing one of these options; they would again go to other station or choose to stay at the 
current station. All of these decisions are made based on assigned probabilities to each station 
type. These decisions are included in the daily schedule at the beginning of each day. 
Chances of going to stations are different from each other. The probability of going to home 
or staying at home, in our model, is considered to be more than going to hub and going to hub 
is much more likely than going to a clinic. Every student, after finishing school, would have 
to do decision making for a number of times each day. Every time, s/he might choose to go or 
stay at home for a 70% chance, go to a hub for a 29% chance, and a clinic for a chance of 
1%.  This assumption was based on a research on children’s activity pattern which suggested 
that children spend 70% of their time at home [80]. We also considered the annual doctor 
consultation per capita to estimate the probability of going to a clinic. According to a 
Common wealth fund article , the average annual physician visits per capita in United States 
was 4 times in 2010 [81] which could mean that a person visits a doctor about every 3 months 
on average and would visit a doctor by the chance of 1% in a typical day.  We assumed that 












Figure 4: Weekday routine decisions 
 
 
The amount of time which the students spend at each station is assigned randomly every time 
they choose a station according to Table 4. We assumed that students spend at least two hours 
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and at most four hours at home and hub stations and one to three hours in the clinic station 
based on a uniform function. As a rule, all the students would spend a fixed time of 7 hours at 





   Station Number of stations Probability of selection  duration in each stay 
School 10         _  7 hours 
Home 3000       70%  2 to 4 hours 
Hub 100       29%  2 to 4 hours 
Clinic 30       1 %    1 to 3 hours 
Table 4: Stations specifications and probabilities  
 
 
Every student is assigned to a specific school randomly and would attend the same school 
throughout whole the simulation. Students are also assigned to a specific home. Nonetheless, 
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Figure 5:  Simulation stages 
 
When students are in school, their time is divided between attending classes and breaks. All 
students are assigned to a friendship group of between 10 and 20 students. These groups 
consist of a student’s friends in school and during school breaks. Friends are randomly 
selected from all classes within the assigned school. 
 
Students in hubs, clinics and school classes are assumed to be seated in a fixed grid pattern 
for the period of time they are assigned to that station. Depending on their position they 
would have different chances of receiving the virus from infectious agents around them.  
 
Infected students in all the stations (school classes, hubs and clinic) can only infect students 
within a specific range. Those who are very close to the infectious person (less than 2 meters) 
have a higher chance of infection than those who are in farther distance. We assumed that 
students who are farther than 4 meters would not get the virus.  
 
The number of students within the infectious range (4 m) of an infected student varies and 
depends on the location of the infectious student in the station. Infectious students located at 
the center of a full station could infect 12 students within 2 meters and 48 students within 4 
meters. In other circumstances, the number of potential students for infection decreases. For 
instance, when an infectious student is located at the corner of a station, the infection range 
could cover 3 and 12 students for 2 meters and 4 meters respectively, and could even reach 
zero if there is no other person in the station. 
 
Students who develop the disease don’t change their routine behavior until symptoms appear, 
and once symptoms appear may or may not cancel their routine. Students who decide to take 
sick leave do so as soon as symptoms appear. We assume that 25% of infected students stay 
at home for the whole infectiousness period. This assumption is based on the fact that among 
mumps infections 20-40 percent are asymptomatic and about half of them only have non-
specific or primarily respiratory symptoms [82].  
 
For the communicable disease safety initiative scenario, students would become more likely 




Students who implement physical distancing are assumed to avoid sitting close to other 
students in the classes and also avoid close contacts in hubs and clinics. These students sit at 
the back of the class with a maximum distance from other students and also make distance in 
hubs and clinics from others. 
 
4.1. Disease Stages  
 
Our simulation model is based on a SEIR model stages which are Susceptible, Exposed-
Infectious, and Recovered states. SEIR models have been widely used in mathematical 
modeling of infectious diseases [55,83,84,85] . In our agent based model, we employ these 
states for every agent singularly and analyze the disease stage for every one of them. This 






Figure 6:  SEIR stages 
 
 
 Every student is considered as an agent in the system. Each agent, at the beginning of the 
simulation, is susceptible to the disease, except one agent who is infected at the starting point.  
The susceptible agent, based on a probability which is achieved by considering the time 
passed with other infectious agents and the distance from them, has a potential to receive the 
virus. As soon as the agent takes the disease and becomes infected, it switches from the first 
state to the second which puts it in the Exposed cluster. In this stage, the agent carries the 
virus but it cannot spread that yet, due to the fact that the disease has a latent period which is 
the time from infection to infectiousness. When the latent period is passed, the agent goes to 
the infectious state, letting it to communicate the virus to others. The amount of time agent 
stays in this state is infectious period. Finally, after this interval, the agent is recovered and 
becomes resilient to the virus. We assumed that all the recovered agents gain immunity. The 
parameter values for the exposed and infectious periods are obtained from the literature and 







4.2.  Simulation Platform 
After acquiring all the necessary information about mumps, building the city structure and 
constructing the outbreak model, the simulations were coded and run in Matlab software 
version R2015a on the Orwell server at Concordia University. 
We consider four scenarios, shown in Figure 7. 
1. In the Baseline scenario, no interventions are applied.  
2. In the school closure scenario, schools are closed in the case of an outbreak above a 
given threshold.  
3. Under the voluntary isolation/distancing scenario, students are educated on the value 
of self-isolation when they are ill, and physical distancing to keep themselves healthy 
or avoid spreading the disease when they are ill and must come into contact with 
others.   
4. Under the mandatory isolation scenario, unvaccinated students are kept away from 
school during an outbreak.  
Each of these scenarios is modeled for no separation strategy and a separation strategy. No 
separation strategy assumes that vaccinated and unvaccinated students are mixed, while under 
the separation strategy, non-vaccinated students are assigned to a separate school. For each 
scenario and strategy combination, every simulation is run for 35 iterations in order to get the 
most reliable results.  




2. School closure 







Figure 7: Simulation scenarios 
 
 
All combinations of scenarios and strategies were run for vaccine coverage values of 90% 
and 95% in order to determine the effect in less vaccinated areas. 
 
 
4.3. Model Validation 
 
In order to validate our model, we compared our simulated attack rate and basic reproductive 
number with several mumps outbreaks in 2005 and 2006. Attack rate was considered among 
vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. We ran 15 different simulations using no separation 
strategy under the baseline scenario and 95% vaccine coverage. We considered the low attack 
rate simulations separately from the high attack rate simulations. In 9 out of 15 simulations, 
less than 25 of 3000 students became ill, with an average attack rate of 1.1 % for 
unvaccinated students and 0.24% for vaccinated students. The average length of these 
outbreaks was 66.2 days. These results are reasonable because in a high vaccinated 
population, outbreaks tend to be very small or not evolve as the chance of infection is low. 
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These results are consistent with numerous records of mumps outbreaks throughout the world 
in which number of infections was very small with a minimum of only one infection [86].  
The high attack rate results (6 out of 15 simulations) represent much longer outbreaks. The 
average attack rate among vaccinated individuals in the simulations is 4.71% with a range of 
2.24% to 5.75%. This is comparable with Cortese et al.’s assessment of the attack rate among 
undergraduate students at  Kansas State University in 2006. In this outbreak, the secondary 
attack rate among roommates with a history of receiving 2 doses of vaccine ranged from 
2.2% to 7.7% [87]. Our results are also consistent with attack rate of an outbreak which 
occurred among college students in Iowa where the attack rates for students with records of 2 
doses vaccine were 3.3% and 6.7% in 2 colleges with vaccine coverage of 98% and 84% 
accordingly [88]. 
Observational studies report that mumps attack rate among unvaccinated household members 
(without a history of mumps) has been in the range of 31%-48% [87]. In the research done by 
Marin et al., in which an outbreak in 2006 among 2 colleges at Iowa was investigated, attack 
rate among unvaccinated students was 23.1% [88].  In 2005, a mumps outbreak in a summer 
camp had an attack rate among unvaccinated children of 42.9% [89]. Our simulation results 
are within the range of these data as we found that average attack rate is 34.64% for 
unvaccinated students with a range of 25.3% to 40.66% in the outbreaks that we synthesized.  
The other important factor in our validation is the basic reproductive number (𝑅0) which is 
the number of infections caused by one infectious individual in a population assuming that 
nobody has been vaccinated. In order to acquire this value, we ran the simulation with 0 
percent vaccine coverage for 20 simulations. We used the validation approach to find 𝑅0. In 
this approach, the number of secondary infections caused by only the first infected agent is 
counted and considered as basic reproductive number [15,54].  The average basic 
reproductive number in our simulations was 9.4 with a range of 2-17. This result is consistent 
with the mumps 𝑅0 range found in the literature. Fan et al. found a mumps 𝑅0 of 3.8-18.2, 
Kanaan et al. found a  range of 4.0-31.5, and Farrington, C. P. et al. found a range of 3.3-25.5 






5. Experiments and Results 
 
To understand the impact of the school separation strategy, we implemented it under different 
scenarios including baseline scenario, school closure scenario, communicable disease safety 
initiative scenario, and mandatory isolation scenario. The scenarios were analyzed and 
compared, in terms of number of infections, outbreak length, and cost, for both no separation 
strategy and separation strategy. Our model did not approve school separation in most of the 
scenarios since it did not decrease number of infections or cost. In fact, we realized that 
separating vaccinated and un-vaccinated students, in the majority of the scenarios, increases 
the average number of infected students, the chance of outbreaks, and the associated cost. 
 
 
Every scenario is run for 35 iterations and the results are compared among scenarios.  We 
used the average of infections, outbreak length, and cost in addition to Wilcoxon signed rank 
test to compare the scenarios. Within each set of the iterations, the size and length of 
outbreaks may vary greatly in size, while in others no virus transmission occurs. Simulation 
runtime varies based on length of outbreaks in iterations and sits somewhere between about 




5.1. Comparison in terms of attack rate and outbreak length 
 
         5.1. 1. School separation without other interventions  
 
In this section, we analyze the outcome of separation strategy under the baseline 
scenario. We evaluated the effect of the school separation by comparing the difference 
between the number of infections in the no separation strategy and the separation 
strategy. We simulated the outbreak for the baseline scenario using both separation 








Strategy Number of 
infection 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  225±96 289±110 days 
90% Separation 234±110 129±56 days 
95% No separation  34±30 134 ±74 days 
95% Separation 85±59 105±58 days 
    Table 5: Separation strategy and No separation strategy under baseline scenario 
 
Implementing the separation strategy for 95% vaccine coverage resulted in an increase 
in average of infections by a 2.5 factor while the average length of outbreak decreased 
by 21.6%.   However, for 90% vaccine coverage, average number of infections 
increased only by 4% and average length of outbreak decreased by 55.3%. As the 
results in table 5 show, separation strategy does not have a considerable effect on the 
average number of infections in 90% vaccine coverage population and it has a very bad 
effect on the average number of infections in 95% vaccine coverage population. In both 
the populations, if an initial infection occurs in an unvaccinated school, almost all the 
students in this school get infected. However, the average length of outbreaks is 
decreased in both of the populations when separation is implemented. Regarding the 
average length of outbreak, separation is more effective when used in less vaccinated 
populations than used when vaccine coverage is very high (95%). We also tested the 
simulation samples based on Wilcoxon signed rank test. According to this test, 
separation did not have a significant effect on number of infections in both the 
populations. It didn’t also have a significant effect on outbreak length in 95% vaccine 
coverage population. However, we observed a significant effect on reduction of 
outbreak length in 90% vaccine coverage population ( p value of .000) . 
  
 
           5.1.2. School closure  
 
School closure scenario was analyzed in both no separation strategy and separation 
strategy to investigate the impact of school closure when a mumps outbreak occurs in 





In our model, school closure was implemented when 3 individuals in the school got 
infectious (about 1% of each school). We used school closure in two different 
approaches: 1- closing any school that reaches this threshold 2- only closing the 
separated school (unvaccinated students) when reaches the threshold.  We also used 





Strategy Number of 
infections 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  50±53 141±94 days 
90% Separation 172±101 114±56 days 
95% No separation  9±7 62±27 days 
95% Separation 46±47 80± 52 days 
Table 6: Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario                      
(closure for 2 weeks) 
Vaccine 
coverage 
Strategy Number of 
infections 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  44±52 114±72 days 
90% Separation 94±82 91±49 days 
95% No separation  7±4 60± 26 days 
95% Separation 15± 22 59± 39 days 
Table 7: Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario                     




Strategy Number of 
infections 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  50±53 141±94 days 
90% Separation 201±111 126±60 days 
95% No separation  9±7 62±27 days 
95% Separation 80±58 121±69 days 
Table 8: Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario – only closing 




Strategy Number of 
infections 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  44±52 114±72 days 
90% Separation 155±106 120±64 days 
95% No separation  7±4 60± 26 days 
95% Separation 52±50 105±57 days 
    Table 9: Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario – only 





Compared to the no separation strategy under the baseline scenario, for a 95% vaccine 
coverage population, if school closure was used for a period of 2 weeks, it was 
effective to decrease average number of infections by 74% and average length of 
outbreak by 54%. If school closure was used for one month, it was able to reduce 
average number of infections by 80% and average length of outbreak by 55%.  
 
For a 90% vaccine coverage population, 2 week school closure reduced average 
number of infections by 78%, and one month school closure reduced the average 
number of infections by 80%. Also, 2 week school closure reduced average length of 
outbreak by 51%, and one month school closure reduced it by 61%. Significance test 
showed that one month school closure had a significant effect on reduction of 
infections (p value of 0.000 and 0.021 for 90% and 95% vaccine coverage) and 
outbreak length (p value of 0.000 and 0.01). Besides, significance test showed that 2 
week school closure, in 90% vaccine coverage population, had a significant effect on 
reduction of infections and outbreak length (p value of 0.000 for infections and 0.001 
for outbreak length). In 95% vaccine coverage population, two week school closure 
did not have a significant effect on infections (p value of 0.051) but had a significant 
effect on reduction of outbreak length (p value of 0.022). These results suggest that 
school closure, in the majority of the scenarios, could substantially decrease the 
intensity and length of a mumps outbreak.  
 
 We also used school closure combined with separation strategy. By comparing the 
results with no separation strategy under school closure scenario, we realized that 
separation strategy, when used in parallel with the school closure, was not effective to 
reduce number of infections, and length of outbreak did not significantly change. 
According to significance tests, all the p values for number of infections and outbreak 
length were greater than 0.05 in our comparisons.  
 
In addition, we implemented school closure for the case that only the unvaccinated 
school would be closed when number of infections goes beyond the threshold. The 
results in table 8 and table 9 show a 18.6% decrease in average number of infections 
for a population with 90% vaccine coverage and 24.7% decrease for a population with 
95% vaccine coverage. The average outbreak length is also decreased by 56.5% and 




          5.1.3. Communicable disease safety initiative 
 
We investigated the effect of communicable disease safety initiative by assuming that 
all the schools implement a communicable disease safety initiative held by a 
specialist. According to Karimi et al., a health promotion session was successful to 
increase students’ physical distancing and self-isolation by 41% for influenza [15]. 
We used the same parameter in our model assuming that students’ behavior change 
would be the same in response to a mumps outbreak. In the baseline scenario, we 
didn’t include the practice of physical distancing.  However, in the educational 
scenario in our model, 41% of infectious students avoid close contacts with other 
students. Besides, students are 41% more likely to stay the whole period of the 







Strategy Number of 
infections 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  13±13 63±33days 
90% Separation 92±78 68±40 days 
95% No separation  6±4 45±12 days 
95% Separation 29±33 52±33 days 




Our results show that the physical distancing and self-isolation behavior, which were 
encouraged by a communicable disease safety initiative, were considerably successful 
to reduce the average number of infections and outbreak length. The information in 
table 10 demonstrates that the resulted self-isolation and physical distancing 
decreased average number of infections by 82% (for 95% vaccine coverage) and 94% 
(for 90% vaccine coverage). The outbreak length was also reduced by 66% (for 95% 
vaccine coverage) and 72% (for 90% vaccine coverage). Significance tests also 
demonstrate that this intervention significantly reduces number of infections (p value 
of 0.000 for 90% vaccine coverage and 0.002 for 95% vaccine coverage) and 
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outbreak length (p value of 0.000 for 90% vaccine coverage and 0.002 for 95% 
vaccine coverage). This information suggests that communicable disease safety 
initiative, specifically an increase in self-initiated behaviors among students can have 
major effects on mumps outbreak control. 
 
The effect of separation strategy was also analyzed when physical distancing and self-
isolation were applied to the model. As we observe in Table 10, average number of 
infections and outbreak length were smaller when we didn’t implement school 
separation. 
For 90% vaccine coverage, separation strategy enlarges the average number of 
infections by a 7 factor, and increases average outbreak length by 7%. For 95% 
vaccine coverage, separation strategy enlarges the average number of infections by a 
4.8 factor, and increases the average outbreak length by 16%. However, the 
significance tests suggest that separation did not have a significant effect on number 
of infections and outbreak length.  
 
 
            5.1.4. Mandatory isolation of unvaccinated students 
 
Mandatory isolation of unvaccinated students was also implemented as a type of 
social distancing measure in our model. In this scenario, whenever an outbreak enters 
a school and passes a threshold (3 infections), the school goes into emergency 
condition and requests the unvaccinated students to not attend the school for a certain 
period of time. We analyzed this scenario by considering isolation periods of 2 weeks 








Strategy Number of 
infections 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  155±87 272±130 days   
90% Separation 201±111 126±60 days 
 36 
 
95% No separation  26±29 108±71 days 
95% Separation 80±58 121±69 days 
 






Strategy Number of 
infections 
Length of outbreak 
90% No separation  95±67 234±123 days 
90% Separation 155±106 120±64 days 
95% No separation  13±10 87±49 days 
95% Separation 52±50 105±57 days 
Table 12: Separation strategy and No separation strategy under mandatory isolation scenario (1 
month) 
 
By using table 11 and table 5, we compared no separation strategy under 2 week 
mandatory isolation scenario with no separation strategy under the baseline scenario. 
The results show a 31% decrease (for 90% vaccine coverage) and a 24% decrease (for 
95% vaccine coverage) in average number of infections, and a 6% reduction (for 90% 
vaccine coverage) and a 19% reduction (for 95% vaccine coverage) in the average 
outbreak length. 
 
Moreover, by evaluating one month mandatory isolation scenario and comparing the 
outputs of table 12 with table 5, for 90% vaccine coverage, we observed a 58% 
decrease in the average number of infections and 19% decrease in the average 
outbreak length.  
For 95% vaccine coverage, we noticed a 62% decrease in average number of 
infections and a 35% decrease in average outbreak length. 
 
The significance tests suggested that there was no significant change in number of 
infections and outbreak length for 95% vaccine coverage population. However, for 
90% vaccine coverage population, number of infections significantly decreased for 
both 2 week and 1 month mandatory isolation (p value of 0.006 for 2 week period and 
0.000 for 1 month period). Outbreak length didn’t have a significant change in 90% 
vaccine coverage population. This gives us the notion that  mandatory isolation could 
be more effective in less vaccinated populations.  
 
We also evaluated the separation strategy in conjunction with mandatory isolation.  
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By comparing separation strategy with no separation strategy, under the mandatory 
isolation scenario, we noticed that, when we used 2 week isolation, separation 
strategy had 30% higher average number of infections for 90% vaccine coverage and 
207% higher average number of infections for 95% vaccine coverage. However, it 
had 54% lower average outbreak length for 90% vaccine coverage and 12% higher 
average outbreak length for 95% vaccine coverage. 
 
When we used one month isolation, separation strategy had 63% greater average 
number of infections for 90% vaccine coverage and 4 times greater average number 
of infections for 95% vaccine coverage. It also had 49% lower average outbreak 
length for 90% vaccine coverage and 20% greater average outbreak length for 95% 
vaccine coverage compared to no separation strategy. 
 
Significance tests did not show a significant change in number of infections and 
outbreak length in 95% vaccine coverage population. For 90% vaccine coverage, the 
tests didn’t demonstrate a significant increase in number of infections either. 
However, outbreak length significantly decreased in 90% vaccine coverage 
population. On overall, these results do not suggest that separation strategy was 






Figure 8: Number of infections in each iteration for different strategies – 95% vaccine coverage     
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5.2. Comparison in terms of costs 
 
In this section, we compared the estimated costs of separation strategy and no separation 
strategy when they are employed under different scenarios. Our calculations are based on the 
costs of lost wages, lost learning, medication, communicable disease safety initiative, 
parental absenteeism, and transportation which were discussed in section 3. Although there 
should be some hidden costs other than what we considered, the cost difference between 
scenarios provides a useful sight to the decision makers. Our results show that separation 
strategy, on the whole, is more costly than no separation strategy in most of the scenarios. 
Moreover, mandatory isolation and implementing a communicable disease safety initiative 
are less costly than the no separation strategy under the baseline scenario for 90% vaccine 





5.2.1. School separation without other interventions 
 
Based on the results in table 13, when the school separation strategy is implemented, 
the average cost is increased by 16% in a 90% vaccine coverage population and 
increased by 176% in a 95% vaccine coverage population. We observed a significant 
increase in the cost for 95% vaccine coverage population (p value of 0.023) and no 
significant increase for 90% vaccine coverage population (p value of 0.112). Hence, 
there is an additional cost for utilizing separation strategy for baseline scenario and 
this difference is significant when separation is used in 95% vaccine coverage 
population. This gives us the idea that implementing school separation strategy in a 
population with less vaccination coverage might be more acceptable than using the 












Strategy Estimated cost  
90% No separation   $190,000±85,000  
90% Separation  $221,000±100,000  
95% No separation   $29,000±29,000  
95% Separation  $80,000±54,000  
Table 13: The costs of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under baseline scenario 
 
5.2.2. School closure 
 
 
Our results demonstrate that using separation strategy under school closure scenario 
requires a higher cost than no separation strategy under baseline scenario. 
 
According to table 14 and table 13, no separation strategy under school closure 
scenario for 2 weeks for 90% and 95% vaccine coverage populations  requires 1.79 
and 2.27 times greater budget compared to no separation strategy under baseline 
scenario. This cost increase is significant (p value of 0.000).  
 
Separation strategy under one month school closure scenario for 90% vaccine 
coverage population, on average, is more costly than no separation strategy under one 
month school closure scenario by 22%. It is also 8% more costly for 95% vaccine 
coverage.  
 
Significance tests show that, in 90% vaccine coverage population, separation strategy 
under school closure scenario for 2 weeks and one month significantly increased the 
costs (p value of 0.000) compared to no separation strategy under school closure 
scenario. In 95% vaccine coverage population, separation with one month closure 
significantly increased the cost (p value of 0.001) but the cost increase for separation 
with 2 week closure was not significant ( p value of 0.404).  
 
According to table 14 and 15, one month school closure, on average, is more costly 
than 2 week school closure by a factor of 1.95 for 90% vaccine coverage population. 
One month school closure, on average,  is more costly than 2 week school closure by 









Strategy Estimated cost  
90% No separation  $340,000±46,000 
90% Separation $525,000±84,000 
95% No separation  $79,000±6,000 
95% Separation $111,000±38,000 
 
Table 14: The cost of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario 





Strategy Estimated cost  
90% No separation  $665,000±59,000 
90% Separation $816,000±69,000 
95% No separation  $220,000±5,000 
95% Separation $238,000±20,000 
Table 15: The cost of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario 




We also considered school closure for only the separated school. According to table 
16 and 17, using separation strategy under school closure scenario for 1 month, 
compared to the same strategy with a 2 week period, involves 10% less average cost 
for 90% vaccine coverage population and 7% more average cost for 95% vaccine 
coverage population.  
The cost increase for the population with 95% vaccine coverage is significant (p value 
of 0.018) but the cost difference is not significant for 90% vaccine coverage 













Strategy Estimated cost  
90% No separation  $340,000±46,000 
90% Separation $226,000±92,000 
95% No separation  $79,000±6,000 
95% Separation $103,000±46,000 
 
 
Table 16: The cost of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario – 





Strategy Estimated cost ($) 
90% No separation  $665,000±59,000 
90% Separation $204,000±88,000 
95% No separation  $220,000±5,000 
95% Separation $111,000±40,000 
Table 17: The cost of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under school closure scenario – 




5.2.3. Communicable disease safety initiative 
 
We calculated the total cost for the scenario in which we applied the effect of 
communicable disease safety initiative. The communicable disease safety initiative 
was supposed to increase self-isolation and encourage physical distancing by 41% 
among students. By comparing table 18 with table 13, we understand that using 
communicable disease safety initiative is highly effective in reducing the outbreak 
costs. Our results show that No separation strategy under communicable disease 
safety initiative reduces the average cost by 93% in a 90% vaccine coverage 
population, and it reduces the average cost by 79% in a 95% vaccine coverage 
population. Significance test also shows that communicable disease safety initiative 
significantly reduces the cost in 90% vaccine coverage population (p value of 0.000) 
but Cost decrease is not significant in 95% vaccine coverage population (p value of 
0.074). This shows that using communicable disease safety initiative in a less 






Strategy Estimated cost  
90% No separation   $ 13,000±12,000  
90% Separation  $ 98,000± 69,000  
95% No separation   $ 6,000±4,000  
95% Separation      $ 38,000±34,000  
Table 18: The costs of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under communicable disease 
safety initiative scenario  
 
We also see that separation strategy under communicable disease safety initiative 
scenario compared with no separation strategy under the same scenario increases the 
average cost hugely by a factor of 7.5 and 6.3 for 90% and 95% vaccine coverage 
populations. The significance tests also demonstrate that this cost increase is 
significant for both the populations (p value of 0.000). As the results show, the 




5.2.4. Mandatory isolation of unvaccinated students 
 
Table 19 and table 13 show that if no separation strategy under mandatory isolation is 
used for 2 weeks in a 90% vaccine coverage population, it decreases the average cost 
by 34% compared to no separation strategy under baseline scenario and if it is used 
for 95% vaccine coverage, it decreases the average cost by 35%.  
According to table 20 and table 13, if no separation strategy under mandatory 
isolation is used for one month in a 90% vaccine coverage population, it decreases the 
average cost by 20.7% compared to no separation under baseline scenario. If this 
strategy is used in a 95% vaccine coverage population, it decreases the average cost 
by 60%. We observe that mandatory isolation successfully decreased the average cost 
in both the populations.  
These results show that mandatory isolation of unvaccinated students was effective to 
reduce the total cost of outbreaks. Moreover, rising the isolation period to one month 
was almost less costly. In no separation strategy, one month mandatory isolation 
compared to 2 week mandatory isolation is, on average, 50% less costly for 95% 
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Strategy Estimated cost  
90% No separation   $  125,000±70,000  
90% Separation  $  182,000±94,000  
95% No separation       $22,000± 26,000 
95% Separation    $88,000±57,000  
Table 19: The costs of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under mandatory isolation 




Strategy Estimated cost  
90% No separation      $ 76,000±55,000  
90% Separation     $ 138,000±85,000  
95% No separation        $11,000±12,000  
95% Separation       $54,000±44,000  
Table 20: The costs of Separation strategy and No separation strategy under mandatory isolation 
scenario (1 month) 
 
Separation strategy, when implemented with mandatory isolation, increased the 
average cost. It magnified the average cost by 45% (2 weeks) and 82% (1 month) for 
90% vaccine coverage population. It also enlarged the average cost by a factor of 4 (2 
weeks) and a factor of 4.9 (1 month) for 95% vaccine coverage. 
Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that mandatory isolation significantly reduced the 
cost for 90% vaccine coverage population (p value of 0.028 for 2 week mandatory 
isolation and p value of 0.000 for 1 month mandatory isolation). However, it did not 
have a significant effect on the reduction of cost for 95% vaccine coverage population 
(p value of 0.18 for 2 week mandatory isolation and p value of 0.15 for 1 month 
mandatory isolation). Besides, separation strategy significantly increased the cost for 
95% vaccine coverage population (p value of 0.003 for 2 week period and 0.002 for 1 
month period). For one month mandatory isolation, it also significantly increased the 
cost in 90% vaccine coverage population (p value of 0.047) but its effect on cost 









Our results showed that increasing the length of an approach such as school closure or 















scenario, increasing the period of school closure from 2 weeks to 1 month decreased the 
average number of infections by 22% for 95% vaccine coverage and 12% for 90% vaccine 
coverage. However, this decrease was not significant (p value of 0.721 for 95% vaccine 
coverage and 1.0 for 90% vaccine coverage). Moreover, increasing the period resulted in a 
significant increase in the cost for both 90% and 95% vaccine coverage (p value of 0.000). 
This information shows that increasing the closure period increased the cost while the 
infections didn’t significantly change. Therefore, 2 week closure could be preferred based on 
our model. 
 
In separation strategy under school closure scenario, increasing the period of school closure 
from 2 weeks to 1 month decreased the average number of infections by 67% for 95% 
vaccine coverage and 45% for 90% vaccine coverage. This decrease was not significant for 
95% vaccine coverage (p value of 0.071) but was significant for 90% vaccine coverage (p 
value of 0.006). Moreover, increasing the period resulted in a significant increase in the cost 
for both 90% and 95% vaccine coverage (p value of 0.000). This information shows that, for 
95% vaccine coverage population, increasing the closure period increased the cost while the 
infections didn’t significantly change. Hence, 2 week closure could be preferred for 95% 
vaccine coverage population. However, for 90% vaccine coverage, we had a decrease in 
number of infections while observing an increase in the cost. To relate the cost of this 
approach with the impact in terms of illnesses, note that increasing the closure period to 1 
month reduces the average number of infections by 78 but this reduction in illness is 
accompanied by a cost of $291,000 which results in the cost of $3,700/infection. If this cost 








In separation strategy under school closure of unvaccinated school, increasing the period of 
school closure from 2 weeks to 1 month decreased the average number of infections by 35% 
for 95% vaccine coverage and 23% for 90% vaccine coverage. However, this decrease was 
not significant (p value of 0.117 for 95% vaccine coverage and 0.098 for 90% vaccine 
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coverage). Moreover, increasing the period resulted in a significant increase in the cost for 
95% vaccine coverage (p value of 0.018) and no significant increase for 90% vaccine 
coverage (p value of 0.28). This information does not suggest the increase of the closure 
period for 95% vaccine coverage. 
 
In no separation strategy under mandatory isolation of unvaccinated students, increasing the 
period of school closure from 2 weeks to 1 month decreased the average number of infections 
by 50% for 95% vaccine coverage and 39% for 90% vaccine coverage. However, this 
decrease was not significant (p value of 0.345 for 95% vaccine coverage and 0.106 for 90% 
vaccine coverage). Moreover, increasing the period did not resulted in a significant increase 
in the cost (p value of 0.07 for 95% vaccine coverage and p value of 0.055 for 90% vaccine 
coverage). Although we didn’t notice a significant change in infections and cost, based on 
this information, increasing the mandatory isolation period could be suggested since the 





















This research uses Agent Based Simulation to investigate the effect of school separation 
strategy in parallel with vaccination and different measures of social distancing to control 
mumps outbreaks. Multiple scenarios, with and without considering school separation, were 
investigated in terms of infection rate, outbreak length, and total costs associated with each of 
them. Then, the advantage and disadvantage of them were compared with each other. We 
aimed to provide solutions which could be utilized by decision makers in disease control 
departments to minimize the intensity of outbreaks and the total costs associated with 
controlling and preventing them.   
 
In this study, separation strategy was analyzed as a potential tool to control the outbreaks. 
However, we realized that it is almost an inappropriate measure for controlling mumps 
outbreak since in most of the scenarios it provides higher number of infections and higher 
total cost. While the separation strategy, in the majority of the scenarios, resulted in shorter 
outbreaks, this is not necessarily better if it means that the same number or more students get 
sick in a shorter period of time. In fact, a longer outbreak with the same number of infections 
could be preferred since it provides more time to vaccinate unvaccinated individuals and take 
proper actions by the government. Moreover, it reduces number of patients’ visit to the 
hospitals during peak periods. If separation strategy results in a shorter outbreak while 
imposing more cost than no separation strategy, it would give us another sign that separation 
strategy is not appropriate for that scenario. 
By evaluating the number of infections, cost, and outbreak length for different scenarios, we 
realized that using separation strategy under most of the scenarios is not a useful measure to 
control the outbreaks. According to figure 13 and 14, the outcomes of separation strategy for 
different scenarios, when they are compared to no separation strategy for the same scenarios, 










School separation strategy produced higher average costs for both 90% and 95% 
vaccine coverage populations. It caused higher average number of infections for 95% 
vaccine coverage and almost the same number of infections for 90% vaccine 
coverage. It also reduced the average outbreak length in both of the populations which 
is not satisfactory for outbreak control if number of infections is the same or higher. 
This information does not approve that separation strategy should be adopted in the 
baseline scenario. As discussed in the results section, in baseline scenario, Wilcoxon 
signed rank test did not show a significant change in number of infections, outbreak 
length, and cost except that separation significantly reduced outbreak length for 90% 
vaccine coverage (p value of 0.000) and cost for 95% vaccine coverage (p value of 
0.023). 
 
 School closure  
 90% vaccine coverage 
The average cost of school separation strategy was higher in all the school closure 
scenarios (2 week closure, 1 month closure) except the scenario which involved 
closure of only unvaccinated school. The average number of infections was higher 
in all the scenarios in this group. The average outbreak length was shorter in all of 
the scenarios (2 week closure, 1 month closure, and 2 week closure of 
unvaccinated school) except the scenario which involved 1 month closure of 
unvaccinated school. The significance tests showed that separation didn’t have a 
significant effect on the increase of infections (p value of 0.66 for 2 week closure 
and p value of 0.7 for 1 month closure) and didn’t reduce the outbreak length 
significantly (p value of 0.72 for 2 week closure and 0.74 for one month closure). 
However, the cost was significantly increased (p value of 0.000). 
 95% vaccine coverage 
The average cost of school separation strategy was higher in all the scenarios 
except one month closure of unvaccinated school. The average number of 
infections was higher in all of the scenarios. The average outbreak length was 
higher in all the scenarios except two week closure of unvaccinated school in 
which the outbreak length was almost the same as no separation strategy. 
The significance tests showed that separation didn’t have a significant effect on 
the increase of infections (p value of 0.92 for 2 week closure and p value of 0.96 
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for 1 month closure) and didn’t reduce the outbreak length significantly (p value 
of 0.60 for 2 week closure and 0.53 for one month closure). The cost didn’t 
significantly increase for 2 week closure (p value of 0.404). However, it was 
significantly increased for 1 month school closure (p value of 0.001). 
These results show that school separation cannot be approved in most of the school 
closure scenarios: 
 School separation with school closure for 2 weeks in both 90% and 95% vaccine 
coverage population could not be approved since it increases both the number of 






















Figure 12: Ratio between separation strategy and no separation strategy in terms of number of 
infections, outbreak length, and cost for different scenarios (90% vaccine coverage population) 
  
 
Figure 13: Ratio between separation strategy and no separation strategy in terms of number of 























 School separation with school closure for 1 month in both 90% and 95% vaccine 
coverage population could not be approved since it increases both the number of 
infections and cost.  
 School separation with 2 week closure of unvaccinated school in 95% vaccine 
coverage population cannot be approved since it increases both number of 
infections and cost. To relate the cost of separation with the impact in terms of 
illnesses for 90% vaccine coverage population, note that according to table 8 and 
table 16, separation reduces the cost by $114,000 but this decrease in cost is 
accompanied by an increase in number of infections by 151, or $755/infection. If 
the cost per infected person is considered high, separation could be approved for 
this population.   
 School separation with 1 month closure of unvaccinated school, in both the 
populations, increases number of infections while reducing the cost. The outbreak 
length is increased in both the populations. To relate the cost of separation with 
the impact in terms of illnesses for 90% vaccine coverage population, note that 
according to table 9 and table 17, separation reduces the cost by $461,000 but this 
decrease in cost is accompanied by an increase in number of infections by 111, or 
$4,153/infection. If this cost is acceptable for preventing an individual from 
infection, separation could be approved for this population.  To relate the cost of 
separation with the impact in terms of illnesses for 95% vaccine coverage 
population, note that according to table 9 and table 17, separation reduces the cost 
by $109,000 but this decrease in cost is accompanied by an increase in number of 
infections by 45, or $2,422/infection. If this cost is acceptable for preventing an 
individual from infection, separation could be approved for this population. 
 
 Mandatory isolation of unvaccinated students 
 
School separation strategy resulted in higher average number of infections and 
costs for both the populations. It also caused shorter average outbreak length in 
90% vaccine coverage and almost the same outbreak length in 95% vaccine 





     
 
Figure 14: Cost per infection for switching from no separation strategy to separation strategy under 
one month school closure of separated school scenario  
 
As discussed in the results section, separation didn’t significantly increase the number 
of infections and didn’t significantly decrease outbreak length (except 2 week 
mandatory isolation). However, it significantly increased the cost for most of the 
scenarios except 2 week mandatory isolation (p value of 0.067). 
 
 Communicable disease safety initiative 
School separation strategy resulted in higher number of infections and costs for both 
the populations. It caused almost the same outbreak length for both of the populations. 
This information does not recommend the separation strategy for communicable 
disease safety initiative scenario. Based on the significance test, separation didn’t 
significantly increase the number of infections and the outbreak length but it 
significantly increased the cost (p value of 0.000). 
As a result of school separation, unvaccinated students had a high rate of interaction with 
each other. Our results show that if an infection occurs in an unvaccinated school, the chance 

















another school can reach the unvaccinated school, the chance of outbreak expansion is very 
high if a student from unvaccinated school gets infected through the interactions with 
students from other schools. In fact, our results demonstrated that in 60% and 40% of the 
iterations (for 90% and 95% vaccine coverage accordingly), unvaccinated school was 
affected by the virus. When this happened, almost all the students received the virus.   
Separating students not only increases the chance of infections in most of the scenarios, but 
also results in a higher amount of cost in the majority of them. The costs associated with 
separation of students such as transportation and healthcare cost make the total cost of 
separation strategy higher than no separation strategy in most of the scenarios. The rate of the 
cost increase, in most of the scenarios, is even higher if separation strategy is implemented in 
a 95% vaccine coverage population, compared to a 90% vaccine coverage population. 
Our results also suggest that no separation strategy under school closure scenario can 
significantly reduce the intensity and length of a mumps outbreak in most of the school 
closure scenarios. For a 95% vaccine coverage population, compared to baseline scenario in 
no separation strategy, school closure was effective to decrease average number of infections 
by 74% and average length of outbreak by 54% if used with 2 weeks closure, and if used with 
one month closure it was able to reduce average number of infections by 79% and average 
length of outbreak by 55%. When we analyzed 2 week school closure for 90% vaccine 
coverage population, we noticed a 78% decrease in average number of infections and the 
average outbreak length was also decreased by 51%. 
 
 Besides, no separation strategy under communicable disease safety initiative, which 
provided an increase in self-initiated behaviors among students, can have a significant effect 
on controlling of the mumps outbreak. We realized that the increase of self-isolation and 
physical distancing, as a result of communicable disease safety initiative, decreased average 
number of infections by 82% (for 95% vaccine coverage) and 94% (for 90% vaccine 
coverage). The outbreak length was also reduced by 66% for 95% vaccine coverage, and was 
reduced by 78% for 90% vaccine coverage. 
 
Moreover, no separation strategy under mandatory isolation of unvaccinated students reduces 
outbreak infections and the reduction is significant for 90% vaccine coverage.  For example, 
when mandatory isolation was applied for a length of 2 weeks, it resulted in a 31% decrease 
in number of infections for 90% vaccine coverage, and 24% decrease for 95% vaccine 
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coverage. Besides, it resulted in a 6% decrease in outbreak length for 90% vaccine coverage, 
and also a 19% decrease for 95% vaccine coverage.  
 
Comparing the average of costs shows that no separation strategy under mandatory isolation 
and communicable disease safety initiative are less costly than no separation strategy under 
baseline scenario for 90% and 95% vaccine coverage population. However, the significance 
tests demonstrate that the cost reduction as a result of these interventions for 95% vaccine 
coverage population is not significant but they are significantly less costly if used in 90% 





























Our motivation for this work was to evaluate the disease impact of a school separation 
strategy. Given the potential ethical and legal complications, the associated health benefits 
would have to be significant to persuade policy makers to adopt such a policy. Our results do 
not suggest that a school separation strategy should be adopted in most of the scenarios since 
this strategy does not decrease the number of infected students and the associated cost is 
increased in the majority of them. Our finding can shed light on the recent debates among 
physicians and parents calling for unvaccinated children to be banned from schools or clinics. 
The decision makers and parents should be aware that, if banning unvaccinated students from 
the schools would result in school separation, it could impose a high risk to the unvaccinated 
students. Based on our results, we can hypothesize that any intervention which involves 
gathering of unvaccinated individuals might end in an unfavourable outcome. Our results 
showed that separating students into different schools could have an adverse effect on the 
outbreaks. We might expect similar outcomes for separation of children into different clinics. 
However, future research is required to specifically investigate the outcome of separation 
strategy in different settings such as clinics. In addition, our work demonstrates that 
educating students on the benefits of adopting physical distancing and self-isolation is 
effective in controlling the mumps outbreak size and costs in a population with 90% vaccine 
















8. Future research  
 
This is the first research that investigates the effect of school separation in parallel with other 
social distancing measures. Future research could analyze the simultaneous effects of 
separation and various control measures on other infectious diseases. Besides, this is the first 
research that inspects mumps outbreaks among students using agent based models. A 
complementary research can extend the simulation modeling for all the individuals in a city 
and check the effect of social distancing measures for different social groups like employees 
at work. Besides, future research can specifically investigate the outcome of separation 
strategy in the clinics. Moreover, we only examined 90% and 95% vaccine coverage. Future 
work can extend the range of vaccine coverage to investigate the effects of separation and 
social distancing measures on the populations that have low vaccine coverage. Besides, future 
research can specifically focus on separation under school closure scenario by evaluating the 
effect of different school closure thresholds on number of infections and total costs.  
Moreover, future research can also evaluate the impact of MMRv vaccine (mumps, measles, 
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Figure 15: New infections in no separation strategy under baseline scenario (a sample iteration for 








Figure 16: Total infections in no separation strategy under baseline scenario (a sample iteration for 









Figure 17: New infections in separation strategy under baseline scenario (a sample iteration for 95% 






Figure 18: Infections in separation strategy under baseline scenario (a sample iteration for 95% 























No-separation  baseline  
 
$190,000 $29,000 
Separation baseline  $221,000 $80,000 
No-separation  school closure  2 weeks $340,000 $79,000 
Separation school closure  2 weeks $526,000 $111,000 
No-separation school closure  1 month $666,000 $220,000 
Separation school closure  1 month $817,000 $237,000 
Separation school closure  only closing   
the separated school  2 weeks $226,000 $104,000 
Separation school closure  only closing   
the separated school  1 month $204,000 $111,000 
No-separation mandatory isolation   2 weeks $125,000 $22,000 
Separation mandatory isolation   2 weeks $182,000 $88,000 
No-separation mandatory isolation   1 month $76,000 $11,000 
Separation mandatory isolation   1 month $138,000 $54,000 
No-separation  communicable disease 
safety initiative  
 
$13,000 $6,000 
Separation communicable disease 
safety initiative  
 
$98,000 $38,000 












Comparison of Separation scenarios with No separation scenarios using Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test  
 
Number of Infections for 95% vaccine coverage                                                                                
(Comparison of Separation scenarios with No separation scenarios) 
  Baseline 
School 
closure      
(2 weeks) 
School 
closure       
(1 month) 
Mandatory 
isolation    
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 





  Z -.999b -.090b -.049c -1.198b -1.138b -.145c 
  Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.318 .929 .961 .231 .255 .885 
  a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
c. Based on positive ranks. 
         Number of Infections for 90% vaccine coverage 
(Comparison of Separation scenarios with No separation scenarios) 
  Baseline 
School 
closure      
(2 weeks) 
School 
closure      
(1 month) 
Mandatory 
isolation    
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 





  Z -.679b -1.841b -.384b -1.365b -1.113b -.487b 
  Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.497 .066 .701 .172 .266 .626 
  a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 









Outbreak length for 95% vaccine coverage 
(Comparison of Separation scenarios with No separation scenarios) 
  Baseline 
School 
closure       
(2 weeks) 
School 
closure       
(1 month) 
Mandatory 
isolation     
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 





  Z -.885b -.513b -.614b -.450c -.885c -.180b 
  Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.376 .608 .539 .652 .376 .858 
  a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
c. Based on negative ranks. 
         
         
         
         Outbreak length for 90% vaccine coverage 
(Comparison of Separation scenarios with No separation scenarios) 
  Baseline 
School 
closure     
(2 weeks) 
School 
closure      
(1 month) 
Mandatory 
isolation     
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 





  Z -3.690b -.348b -.322b -2.984b -2.055b -.676b 
  Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .728 .748 .003 .040 .499 
  a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 











Cost for 95% vaccine coverage 
(Comparison of Separation scenarios with No separation scenarios) 
  Baseline 
School 
closure    (2 
weeks) 
School 
closure    (1 
month) 
Mandatory 
isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 





  Z -2.277b -4.373b -3.259b -2.981b -3.079b -3.915b 
  Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.023 .000 .001 .003 .002 .000 
  a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         Cost for 90% vaccine coverage 
(Comparison of Separation scenarios with No separation scenarios) 
  Baseline 
School 
closure    (2 
weeks) 
School 
closure    (1 
month) 
Mandatory 
isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 





  Z -2.277b -4.373b -3.259b -2.981b -3.079b -3.915b 
  Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.023 .000 .001 .003 .002 .000 
  a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 










Comparison of No separation scenarios with No separation under baseline scenario 
using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test  
 
 
Number of infections for 95% vaccine coverage                                                                                
(Comparison of scenarios with No separation under baseline scenarios) 
  
School 








isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 


















.051 .021 .198 .147 .002 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 





Number of infections for 90% vaccine coverage                                                                                
(Comparison of scenarios with No separation under baseline scenarios) 
  
School 








isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 


















.000 .000 .006 .000 .000 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 








Outbreak length for 95% vaccine coverage                                                                                












isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 


















.022 .010 .125 .112 .002 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 




Outbreak length for 90% vaccine coverage                                                                                












isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 


















.001 .000 .713 .151 .000 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 









Cost for 95% vaccine coverage                                                                                
(Comparison of scenarios with No separation under baseline scenarios) 
  
School 








isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 


















.028 .010 .179 .149 .074 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 




Cost for 90% vaccine coverage                                                                                
(Comparison of scenarios with No separation under baseline scenarios) 
  
School 








isolation   
(2 weeks) 
Mandatory 


















.000 .000 .028 .000 .000 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
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